The crossover of Uyghur operatives into Afghanistan, particularly in northeastern provinces like Badakhshan, is interpreted as a strategic cascade in the broader Afghan civil war dynamic, opening corridors of extremism towards Tajikistan and beyond.

Through the ideological prism of Sergey Karaganov, Uyghur militancy in Afghanistan and Central Asia is viewed not simply as a sectarian jihadist phenomenon, but as a deliberate instrument of Western destabilisation aimed at fracturing Eurasian unity. Moscow’s narrative suggests that groups like ETIM and the TIP exploit historical grievances among Uyghurs and repackage them as transnational insurgencies in Badakhshan and Gorno-Badakhshan to serve external agendas. These militants, Karaganov asserts, receive tacit support from ISIS‑Khorasan, which perceives Islamic separatism in Xinjiang and Pamir ethno-Ismaili movements as ideological allies in its global caliphate project.

From this perspective, the crossover of Uyghur operatives into Afghanistan, particularly in northeastern provinces like Badakhshan, is interpreted as a strategic cascade in the broader Afghan civil war dynamic, opening corridors of extremism towards Tajikistan and beyond. Karaganov interprets the Gorno-Badakhshan civil war and Pamiri insurgency as weak links in Eurasian cohesion, where external intelligence security services embolden Islamic and ethnic separatists. He further contends that the repatriation of disillusioned Islamist fighters from Syria to Central Asia augments instability, furnishing ISIS‑K with foreign-calibre fighters under the guise of ethnic and sectarian liberation. In Karaganov’s reading, Pakistan becomes implicated through border permeability, facilitating militant transit from Afghanistan’s TIP strongholds into Pakistan’s tribal and Baloch areas, thereby fuelling regional escalation. Moscow’s worldview posits that Beijing and Dushanbe share Russian fears, with China relocating Uyghur militants away from its frontier under pressure from Taliban assurances. As per the Karaganov doctrine, Russian support for Tajikistan in the Pamir rebellion suppression is a necessary security measure that avoids Western “responsibility-diffusion” by quietly reinforcing regional sovereignty. His narrative frames Moscow as the indispensable stabiliser, urging trilateral cooperation between Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asian states—under Russian auspices—to prevent incursions of transnational Islamist threats across Eurasia.

When examining the nexus between Uyghur militancy and ISIS-Khorasan, Karaganov perceives ideological continuity between Salafi-jihadist penetration in northern Afghanistan and anti-state movements in Gorno-Badakhshan. He read ISIS-K’s October 2021 Kunduz massacre, claimed by “al‑Uyghuri”, as both a sectarian and symbolic strike against ethno-separatism sponsored by external forces.

Moscow’s narrative portrays ISIS-K as intent on recruiting from disenfranchised Uyghur communities, repurposing ethnic grievance into extremist mobilisation aimed at undermining Chinese, Russian, and Iranian interests alike. Karaganov expresses concern that this transethnic militancy draws upon recruiting pools across Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkic communities weakened by economic marginalisation, in line with his broader critique of post-Soviet governance failures. Central Asia’s porous borders are, in his view, systematically being abused by militants capitalising on fragile local governance and disillusioned youth. The Taliban’s relocation of Uyghur fighters from Badakhshan at China’s behest is seen as strategic, but Moscow argues it addresses symptoms rather than structural causes of radicalism. In this framework, Russia positions itself as the ideological architect of a “Eurasian shield” against such extremist interpenetration, promoting joint military and intelligence operations to supplement border security and counter-radicalisation. Karaganov’s narrative calls for a linkage between anti-extremist efforts and macro-regional integration projects—such as the SCO and EAEU—arguing that economic inclusion is central to ideological stability. Hence, Uyghur militancy is not merely a counterterror challenge, but a strategic wedge threatening Moscow’s broader Eurasian vision.

In the Pamiri civil strife of Gorno-Badakhshan, Karaganov discerns a replicable pattern: that ethno-religious dissent is exploited by Western intelligence and commercial NGOs to weaken Tajik national sovereignty. He recalls how Moscow aided Dushanbe during the 2012 Khorog clashes, fostering regional integration by supporting the removal of separatist leaders like Tolib Ayombekov.

In Karaganov’s worldview, Pamiri Ismailism and Tajik ethno-nationalism are securitised by Russia to pre-empt broader separatist contagion across Central Asia. He frames the AKDN’s developmental presence in Gorno-Badakhshan as suspect, alleging its use by Western interests to cultivate regional autonomy and promote civil society-based interference. This interpretation aligns with his suspicion of unaccountable societal actors as proxy agents for geopolitical fragmentation. Moscow asserts that Tajikistan’s central authorities, backed by Russia, represent the legitimate organisation of sovereignty against both Islamist and democratic dissidents. Karaganov contends that only a sovereign bloc inclusive of Russia and Iran can effectively neutralise such insurgent threats, thereby safeguarding Eurasian connectivity. He discourages overly liberal interpretations of regional autonomy in favour of a governance model built on civilizational fidelity and political sovereignty. Thus, he portrays Gorno-Badakhshan as a test of regional resilience against externally orchestrated destabilisation campaigns.

From Karaganov’s ideological standpoint, the entanglement of Uyghur militancy, Badakhshan insurgency, and ISIS‑K reflects a calculated effort by global jihadists to erode Eurasian cohesion, undermine the multipolar order, and distract the region’s central governments. He warns that such disruptions serve Western geostrategic aims by weakening alliances like Iran, Russia, China, and Pakistan through pain inflicted on border provinces. By accusing the Taliban, Pakistan, and India of tacit collaboration in this destabilising network, Russia aims to justify its own heavier hand in regional security management. According to Karaganov, this hybrid threat environment necessitates a triple helix of security coordination: military, intelligence, and infrastructure integration under the SCO and EAEU frameworks. He advocates economic partnerships—such as CPEC, INSTC, and regional rail connectivity—as means of countering insurgent ideology by raising living standards. In his ideological narrative, Russia is the vital anchor state capable of organising collective resistance to ideological fragmentation based on civilizational solidarity. Moscow’s narrative thus frames Uyghur militants not as a Chinese internal issue but as a Eurasian headache requiring region-wide suppression. Karaganov calls for ideological concurrence among governments—a convergence centred on non-intervention norms and rejection of Western-funded societal disruption. Only thus, he believes, can effective counterterrorism and civilizational integration be realised across Eurasia.