Maryam Habib (Director at the Islamabad Institute for Interfaith Harmony and Public Life, Islamabad)

The Pakistan-Afghanistan Durand Line remains one of the most complex security frontiers in contemporary South Asia. It is a zone where state sovereignty, transnational militancy, and local tribal structures intersect in a continuous struggle for authority and legitimacy. In this setting, the Pakistan Army functions as the principal state institution responsible not only for maintaining security but also for reshaping governance, identity, and development across the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), particularly South Waziristan. To comprehend this evolving scenario, several institutional approaches — organisational, regional and security institutionalism — provide an analytical foundation, with security institutionalism offering the most comprehensive explanation of the Army’s enduring influence in this volatile region.

Organisational Institutionalism elucidates how institutions as organisations internalise governance logics through routines, hierarchies, and bureaucratic practices. Ahmed and Siddiqui (2024), in “Organisational Dynamics of Security Institutions in Pakistan”, explain that the Army has evolved beyond its traditional defence role to function as a governance organisation in post-conflict territories. In areas like South Waziristan, it has built administrative mechanisms parallel to civilian structures, supervising reconstruction, development and law enforcement. This organisational adaptation enables the military to fill the governance vacuum left by fragile civil institutions. Consequently, local administrative order has been restructured along military lines — discipline, surveillance and command — creating a controlled form of stability while limiting participatory governance.

Regional Institutionalism, as advanced by Farooq and Khan (2021) in “Regional Security and Institutional Responses in South Asia,” situates Pakistan’s internal governance dynamics within regional security imperatives. The Army’s strategy along the Durand Line is not confined to domestic stability; it is a direct response to Afghanistan’s persistent volatility and international counterterrorism frameworks. The institution’s regional adaptation — building fences, conducting cross-border intelligence operations, and engaging in counter-narrative campaigns — illustrates how Pakistan’s internal security governance is shaped by regional insecurity. The porous nature of the border, coupled with the constant threat of militant infiltration, compels the Army to maintain a securitised posture that integrates domestic control with regional defence strategy.

However, the most compelling analytical lens for understanding the current situation is Security Institutionalism, a concept recently articulated by Willasey-Wilsey (2023) in “The Paradox of the Pakistan Army.” He argues that the Army’s power extends beyond the battlefield into the everyday structures of governance, embedding security logic into the political and administrative institutions of the state. This framework aligns precisely with the situation in South Waziristan, where the Army’s security apparatus functions as a mechanism of social engineering and political restructuring. The military’s role in local governance, education and economic management exemplifies how security priorities have been institutionalised within state and societal processes.

Security institutionalism helps explain how the Army’s structural dominance has transformed both governance and identity in FATA. Through securitised development projects, strict border regulation, and the suppression of non-state power centres, the Army has weakened tribal autonomy and curtailed traditional systems that once defined local authority. Religious conservatism and anti-state narratives — historically reinforced by cross-border networks — have been discouraged through continuous monitoring, civic education programmes, and selective political inclusion. In this process, the military has constructed a new form of state-centric identity, aligning local populations with the broader national security discourse. This transformation represents the internalisation of security as a governing principle rather than a temporary response to conflict.

Moreover, the institutionalisation of security logic across the Durand Line reflects the gradual convergence between Security Institutionalism and Securitisation Theory. The latter, developed within the Copenhagen School of International Relations, explains how political actors frame issues as existential threats, thereby legitimising extraordinary measures. In Pakistan’s case, the Army’s discursive framing of militancy, drug trafficking, and border infiltration as existential threats to national integrity has justified the militarisation of governance in FATA. The securitisation of development and identity politics ensures that governance itself becomes a strategic tool of defence policy.

The current governance structure along the Durand Line demonstrates the practical synthesis of these theoretical insights. Organisationally, the Army has built durable administrative routines; regionally, it has adapted to Afghanistan’s instability; and through security institutionalism, it has embedded a security-driven logic within the very fabric of state–society relations. This institutional transformation has produced a paradoxical outcome: peace through control, stability through surveillance, and integration through securitisation.

For scholars of International Relations and Political Science, the Durand Line thus represents a living laboratory of institutional evolution under persistent conflict. The Pakistan Army’s role cannot be understood through traditional realist or functionalist lenses alone. Security institutionalism reveals that military influence in Pakistan is not an anomaly but an institutional response to structural fragility, regional volatility, and the perpetual need to secure legitimacy in a contested frontier. As Pakistan continues to balance between counterterrorism obligations and state-building goals, understanding this transformation through institutional theory remains essential for evaluating the future of governance, identity, and stability in its borderlands.