Darakhshan Afsari

The return of the Taliban to power in August 2021 reignited fears of sectarian violence and ethnic marginalisation, particularly for the Hazara community, who had historically suffered under Taliban rule. However, contrary to the expectations of total repression, the Taliban have demonstrated conditional tolerance and administrative leniency in Hazara-dominated regions such as Bamyan, Daikundi, and parts of Ghazni. This paradox can be interpreted through the lens of Paul Collier’s conflict economy framework, which posits that in post-conflict or fragile states, ethnic and regional concessions are often driven not by ideological evolution, but by the strategic calculus of resource consolidation and economic survival. For the Taliban, facilitating the Hazara has become a necessary trade-off in exchange for domestic calm and international economic openings. The Hazara’s geographic control over central highlands rich in saffron, livestock, and coal – coupled with their ties to Iranian markets – make their inclusion economically rational. Collier’s thesis emphasises how rebel groups, once transformed into ruling elites, pivot from ideological rigidity to selective pragmatism when economic incentives are at stake. In Afghanistan, this pragmatism is evident in the Taliban’s tolerance of limited Hazara governance in exchange for regional stability and revenue continuity. Thus, economic necessity – not political reform – has coerced the Taliban into accommodating the Hazara. The groundwork for such toleration is deeply rooted in the Taliban’s need to secure access to production, trade corridors, and labour that the Hazara dominantly influence.

This coercive pragmatism further manifests in the Iran-Afghanistan barter trade agreement signed in December 2022, where the Taliban granted infrastructure flexibility and social autonomy in Hazara regions in exchange for oil, wheat, medicine, and electricity from Iran. From Collier’s perspective, this represents a textbook case of conflict actors seeking to convert insecure war economies into stabilised zones of rent-extraction. The Taliban, lacking international legitimacy and formalised aid, rely increasingly on border trade as a survival mechanism. The Hazara, with their historical trade links to Iran and cultural ties to the Shia clerical networks of Qom and Mashhad, serve as an indispensable conduit in this barter system. The Taliban, aware of their weak bureaucratic capacity, have thus allowed Hazara-led local councils, NGOs, and economic agents to administer logistics and infrastructure without overt interference. This is not inclusion by design, but inclusion by coercive utility – precisely what Collier outlines in his studies on post-conflict bargaining economies. Without Hazara cooperation, the barter system would risk collapse, plunging central Afghanistan into renewed instability. The Taliban’s conditional facilitation of the Hazara is thus part of a broader pattern where survival imperatives override dogmatic sectarianism. In effect, the Taliban are trading repression for revenue, and ideology for infrastructure continuity.

Moreover, the Taliban’s fragile fiscal condition has left them no option but to leverage functioning micro-economies such as those in Hazarajat, which maintain modest levels of internal productivity and external connectivity. The post-2021 Afghan economy operates in isolation, with foreign reserves frozen and international sanctions curtailing formal financial flows. This has placed enormous pressure on internal tax collection and cross-border trade, particularly with neighbours like Iran. The Hazara regions, although economically marginalised under previous regimes, have become vital nodes in this informal economy due to their agricultural productivity and access to remittance channels. Collier argues that economic control, not political control, becomes paramount in such conflict environments. The Taliban’s policy towards the Hazara is consistent with this logic – they need not formally integrate or ideologically align with them, but merely extract cooperation to preserve economic flow. This explains the Taliban’s silence towards Hazara-run education programmes or local civic bodies supported by Iranian aid or NGOs. As long as these structures do not threaten political monopoly, they are tolerated for their contribution to regional economic resilience. Economic coercion thus creates a strategic coexistence that the Taliban cannot afford to disrupt.

It is also significant that Hazara migration patterns, both internal and external, play into the Taliban’s calculus of containment and concession. Many Hazara families receive remittances from relatives working in Iran, the Gulf, and parts of Europe, injecting foreign currency into local markets that the Taliban indirectly benefit from through informal taxation and local trade. In line with Collier’s theory, such remittance economies serve as buffers that reduce the state’s burden of welfare provisioning, making it economically prudent for rulers to permit minority autonomy. The Taliban have thus refrained from openly targeting Hazara remittance flows or migration channels, particularly via Zaranj and Islam Qala. This selective permissiveness enhances economic liquidity in the central provinces without requiring fiscal investment by the regime. Further, Hazara-linked traders often act as intermediaries in Iran-Afghanistan fuel and food transactions, making them indispensable to border logistics. The Taliban, though ideologically hostile, cannot alienate these actors without disrupting the only operational parts of their shadow economy. As Collier notes, control over economic actors becomes more important than political subjugation in fragile state orders, making toleration a form of elite bargaining rather than ethical governance.

Finally, the broader geopolitical calculus of Iran’s influence in Afghanistan further conditions the Taliban’s approach to the Hazara. Tehran has made it clear – both through official diplomacy and unofficial border actions – that it will not tolerate large-scale violence against Shia communities. Iranian goods, subsidies, and clerical influence are deeply embedded in Hazarajat, and any confrontation would risk border destabilisation. Collier’s framework suggests that external stakeholders in conflict economies often dictate domestic alliances through resource dependency. For the Taliban, maintaining calm in Hazara areas ensures uninterrupted barter flows and avoids regional fallout. Additionally, the Taliban’s vision for long-term survival may involve seeking greater regional legitimacy through quietism rather than confrontation. Facilitating the Hazara thus becomes part of a coerced strategy to placate both internal economic networks and external patrons. In sum, the Taliban’s facilitation of the Hazara is not a departure from their ideological past, but a coerced adaptation to the economic and geopolitical realities of a post-conflict, sanctions-stricken Afghanistan – exactly the type of reactive governance Collier identifies in his post-war statebuilding analysis.